Right to Be Forgotten Judgment and Its Transformative Impact on Indian Privacy Law

A Judgment Two Decades in the Making

On May 29, 2026, Justice Sachin Datta of the Delhi High Court pronounced what I believe will be remembered as one of the most consequential judgments in the history of Indian digital and privacy jurisprudence. In a consolidated batch of over 35 writ petitions spanning acquittals, matrimonial disputes, quashed FIRs, and cases of mistaken identity, the Court delivered a comprehensive, structured ruling that for the first time gives the "Right to Be Forgotten" (RTBF) a firm constitutional home in Indian law, operationalises it through enforceable reliefs, and lays down a principled framework for balancing it against competing constitutional values.

Having practiced cyber law for two decades, I have watched this area evolve from a theoretical whisper in academic circles to a pressing reality in my clients' lives. I have filed petitions on behalf of acquitted persons whose arrest records dominated Google searches. I have counselled victims of sexual offences who found their identities splashed across legal databases. I have advised companies whose resolved disputes continued to haunt them commercially. This judgment speaks directly to all of them.

In this article, I will dissect the judgment's key holdings, explain its immediate practical implications, and assess the long-term impact it is likely to have on Indian privacy law.

Part I: The Constitutional Architecture, Privacy Meets the Digital Age

1.1 The Puttaswamy Foundation

The judgment's constitutional analysis begins, as it must, with K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1. The nine-judge Constitution Bench's recognition of privacy as a fundamental right under Article 21, encompassing informational privacy, bodily privacy, and the privacy of choice, provided the bedrock upon which Justice Datta constructs his edifice.

Crucially, the Court revisits Justice Kaul's concurring opinion in Puttaswamy, which had already sketched the contours of the RTBF as flowing from informational privacy. The relevant passage bears re-reading:

"The right of an individual to exercise control over his personal data and to be able to control his/her own life would also encompass his right to control his existence on the internet... If we were to recognise a similar right, it would only mean that an individual who is no longer desirous of his personal data to be processed or stored, should be able to remove it from the system where the personal data/information is no longer necessary, relevant, or is incorrect and serves no legitimate interest."

The Delhi High Court takes this observation which remained, until now, an obiter expression and builds upon it a full jurisprudential structure. The significance of this cannot be overstated. The Court is not creating a new right; it is giving practical enforceability to what the Supreme Court had already recognised in principle.

1.2 The Critical Distinction: Existence vs. Searchability

The most intellectually important contribution of this judgment is a distinction that courts globally have struggled to articulate clearly: the difference between the existence of a judicial record and its name-based digital searchability.

Justice Datta holds, with admirable clarity:

"'Open justice' requires that judicial records exist, be maintained, and be accessible to those with a legitimate purpose. These requirements are fully satisfied by the maintenance of court records, accessible by case number, citation, or other purposeful search. What open justice does not require, and what it cannot be extended to mandate, is that a private individual's name functions as a permanent and unlimited retrieval key, through a commercial search engine..."

This is a paradigm shift. For years, Google, Indian Kanoon, and media houses have used "open justice" as a near-absolute shield against any privacy-based claims. The Court dismantles this shield not by undermining open justice, but by re-examining what open justice actually demands. A judgment accessible by case number, court, or citation serves every institutional purpose of open justice. What it does not require is a commercial algorithm that surfaces a person's arrest record the moment anyone enters their name.

Part II: The Anatomy of the Framework, What the Court Actually Decided

2.1 Two Distinct Reliefs: De-indexing and Masking

The Court carefully delineates two forms of relief, which are complementary rather than alternative:

De-indexing (De-linking): A direction to search engines (Google, Bing/Microsoft) and legal database platforms (Indian Kanoon) to remove specific URLs from name-based search results. The underlying record is untouched. The judgment continues to exist; it simply no longer surfaces when someone searches the petitioner's name. In respect of Indian Kanoon specifically, the direction operates by disabling name-based search functionality for the relevant records.

Masking: A direction to the court's own registry to replace a party's name and personal identifiers with neutral references (e.g., "ABC" or "XYZ") in the publicly accessible digital version of a judgment, while preserving the complete, un-redacted version in internal records. This operates at the source level the judicial record itself.

The Court holds that de-indexing reduces the amplification of harm, while masking addresses the harm at its source. Together, they provide the most complete protection available.

2.2 The Three-Part Legal Test

The Court applies the Puttaswamy threefold test to every prayer for de-indexing or masking:

1. Legality: Is there a valid law authorising the continued unlimited indexing? The Court finds there is none. In fact, Rule 3(1)(d) of the IT Rules, 2021 obliges intermediaries to comply with court orders meaning the legal framework already contemplates and facilitates this relief.
2. Legitimate Aim: Is there a sufficiently specific, legitimate aim served by the unlimited name-based searchability of records whose proceedings have concluded? In cases of acquittal, discharge, quashing, settlement, and purely private disputes, the Court finds no such aim exists.
3. Proportionality: Is permanent, unlimited name-based digital searchability proportionate to any legitimate aim? The Court holds that it is not the harm to the individual is disproportionate to any purpose that survives scrutiny.

2.3 The Seven Balancing Factors

For practitioners advising clients, the Court's identification of seven contextual factors for the de-indexing analysis will be the working toolkit:

1. The nature of the information intimate personal life vs. public conduct
2. Time elapsed since publication and continuing relevance
3. The public role of the individual heightened transparency demands for public figures
4. Accuracy and completeness outdated or partial disclosures cannot justify continuing intrusion
5. Impact on dignity and autonomy reputational harm, stigma, disproportionate interference with a dignified life
6. Degree of digital accessibility search engines amplify harm beyond what mere publication does
7. Effect on freedom of expression and public record integrity

These are not a checklist but a contextual balancing matrix. This is the right approach the Court wisely avoids mechanical application and insists on fact-specific analysis.

2.4 The Absolute Bars, When Relief Will Not Be Granted

Equally important is what the Court does not protect. It identifies two absolute bars where neither de-indexing nor masking will be available:

First, convictions for offences against women or children. The Court grounds this in Article 15(3) and the POCSO Act, recognising a continuing public interest in the accessibility of such information  including for the protection of potential future victims. This is a sound and necessary limitation.

Second, convictions involving breach of public trust public servants, elected representatives, fiduciaries. Democratic accountability demands that the public retain access to this information indefinitely.

Additionally, the public figure principle drawn from R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu (1994)  is carefully calibrated. A public figure loses privacy claims only as to conduct in their public role. The intimate details of a celebrity's matrimonial dispute, for instance, do not become matters of public interest merely by virtue of their fame.

Part III: The Jurisprudence on Search Engines A Critical Development

3.1 Google Is Not a Passive Conduit

One of the most significant holdings in this judgment and one with the broadest practical consequences concerns the legal characterisation of search engines. Google had argued, as it always does, that it performs a "passive and neutral function" akin to a library index.

The Court flatly rejects this. Citing Google Spain SL v. Mario Costeja González (Case C-131/12) of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the ECHR's Grand Chamber judgment in Hurbain v. Belgium, the Court holds that Google, through its three-stage process of crawling, indexing, and serving search results, is an active processor of personal data. It determines the purposes and means of that processing. It derives commercial revenue from advertising linked to those searches. It aggregates, ranks, and serves information in response to name-based queries with a commercial logic driven by engagement, sensationalism, and click-through rates not accuracy or completeness.

This characterisation matters enormously. It means:

• Google cannot shelter behind a "mere conduit" defence
• Google's processing of personal data in name-based searches is a distinct and additional act from the original publication
• Google's activities are not an exercise of any fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a) that right is available only to Indian citizens and pertains to conscious, purposeful human expression, not algorithmic mechanical processing

This is Indian law explicitly adopting and adapting the European CJEU reasoning on search engine liability a major milestone.

3.2 Indian Kanoon's Distinct Position

The Court recognises that Indian Kanoon's position is somewhat different from Google's it curates, organises, and disseminates legal information, which is closer to publication than pure mechanical indexing. Accordingly, the relief directed against Indian Kanoon is more nuanced: restriction of name-based search functionality rather than a direction to de-index specific URLs. Judgments remain accessible on Indian Kanoon by case number, citation, court, and date. What changes is that a person's name can no longer function as the unlimited search key that surfaces those records.

Part IV: The Maintainability Question Writs Against Private Entities

4.1 Enforcing Fundamental Rights Against Non-State Actors

Multiple respondents raised a preliminary objection that writ petitions under Article 226 cannot lie against private entities like Google, Indian Kanoon, media houses, X Corp (formerly Twitter), and Microsoft. The Court rejects this objection comprehensively.

The basis is the Supreme Court's own ruling in Kaushal Kishor v. State of U.P. (2023) 4 SCC 1, where a Constitution Bench held that fundamental rights under Articles 19 and 21 can be enforced against persons other than the State or its instrumentalities. Puttaswamy had already stated that informational privacy operates against non-State actors.

The Court's reasoning is compelling: if the right to informational privacy exists against non-State actors (as the Supreme Court says it does), then the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 to enforce that right cannot be ousted merely because the violating entity is private. To hold otherwise would render the fundamental right to informational privacy "illusory in precisely the domain where it is most acutely threatened the digital domain."

This is a landmark holding for Indian cyber law practice. It resolves a long-standing uncertainty about the amenability of social media platforms, search engines, and digital media entities to writ jurisdiction.

Part V: Category-by-Category Analysis How the Court Applied the Framework

The judgment's application section is a masterclass in nuanced, fact-sensitive adjudication. Let me highlight the most important category-level holdings:

5.1 Acquittals, Discharges, and Quashings Relief as Near-Right

The Court holds that persons acquitted, discharged, or whose proceedings were quashed are entitled to have that legal determination reflected in their digital identity. The presumption of innocence a substantive guarantee under Article 21 requires that judicial exoneration be given full practical effect, including in the digital domain.

Specific petitioners who received de-indexing relief include individuals acquitted of charges ranging from smuggling (W.P. 8557/2021) to rape (W.P. 5400/2023, W.P. 3687/2024) to CBI corruption cases (W.P. 11553/2021) to NI Act offences (W.P. 9824/2023, post-settlement).

Of particular note: The Court holds that in acquittals from sexual offence charges, where the petitioner is a private individual and no specific continuing public interest can be identified, "the case for masking and de-indexing follows almost as a matter of course from the acquittal itself." The stigma of a rape allegation is so severe and permanent that acquittal without digital relief is, in effect, a hollow vindication.

5.2 Purely Private and Matrimonial Disputes The Core of Privacy

Drawing from Puttaswamy's identification of "family life, marriage, procreation, and personal relationships" as the very core of the protected zone of privacy under Article 21, the Court grants relief across multiple matrimonial and private civil dispute cases (W.P. 16476/2023, W.P. 6695/2024, W.P. 11862/2025, W.P. 7763/2024, W.P. 6047/2024, W.P. 12179/2024). Once such proceedings have concluded, their continued name-based searchability serves no purpose and cannot be justified.

The public figure principle was also tested here. In W.P. 6047/2024, involving a renowned chef's matrimonial dispute, the Court held that the chef's professional public status does not transform the intimate details of his marriage into matters of public interest. His former wife, who is a private individual, retains her full right to informational privacy. The public figure principle extends only to conduct in the public role.

5.3 Abated Proceedings Protection for Surviving Families

In W.P.(Crl.) 1861/2022, concerning bail orders related to a deceased son-in-law, the Court develops an important ancillary principle: where proceedings have abated by death without any merits-based determination, de-indexing may still be warranted on grounds of proportionality, where continued digital accessibility causes disproportionate harm to the surviving family particularly children who had no involvement in the proceedings.

5.4 Relief Denied The Court's Restraint is as Important as its Generosity

The Court's discipline in denying relief is as significant as its grants:

W.P. 6790/2021 (Public Figure's Drunken Behaviour): A self-described public figure and television artist sought removal of videos and articles about drunken behaviour from over a decade ago. Relief denied. The RTBF is a protection for private individuals against the disproportionate perpetuation of legally extinguished allegations not "a mechanism for the selective erasure of past conduct by those who have voluntarily assumed a public identity." If the content is false, defamation proceedings remain available.

W.P. 12620/2021 (UK Conviction for Blackmail and Fraud): The petitioner sought removal of his conviction record from a United Kingdom court. Relief denied. A serious conviction of relatively recent vintage, for offences whose relevance to those dealing with the petitioner does not diminish with time, cannot be effaced through the RTBF.

W.P. 9940/2024 (Public Figure's Quashed Sexual Offence FIR): A person claiming to be a public figure sought relief after a sexual offence FIR was quashed on settlement. Relief denied. The combination of public figure status and the serious nature of the allegations (sexual offences) means a continuing public interest in accessibility survives the settlement.

W.P. 11372/2022 (Bike Bot Scam Coverage): Relief rejected because the current status of the underlying proceedings was not placed on record. The Court cannot adjudicate a de-indexing prayer without knowing whether proceedings have concluded and in whose favour.

Part VI: Impact on Indian Privacy Law The Broader Significance

6.1 Filling the Legislative Vacuum Through Constitutional Adjudication

India's Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 (DPDPA) conspicuously does not recognise an explicit right to be forgotten. The respondents argued this as a ground for denying relief. The Court, citing Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (1997) where the Supreme Court laid down sexual harassment guidelines in the absence of legislation  holds that Constitutional Courts are "not merely empowered but duty-bound to step in" where a legislative vacuum exists and fundamental rights are at stake.

This is a precedent of considerable significance. It establishes that the absence of statutory codification of the RTBF does not deprive Constitutional Courts of jurisdiction to enforce it through constitutional principles. The Court is explicit: "This Court is thus, not legislating, but applying constitutional principles to fill in a gap that the legislature has not yet addressed."

6.2 A Framework for Future Litigation

For cyber law practitioners, the immediate practical impact of this judgment is a clear, structured framework for advising clients and drafting petitions:

• Identify the category: acquittal/discharge/quashing, settlement/compounding, purely private/matrimonial, or "other"
• Assess the public figure dimension: Does the content relate to conduct in a public role?
• Apply the absolute bars: conviction for offences against women/children, or breach of public trust
• Document the harm: reputational damage, professional impact, social stigma, passage of time
• Specify the relief: de-indexing (Google and all domains, globally), Indian Kanoon name-search restriction, and/or masking application before the originating court

6.3 Global De-indexing An Extraterritorial Reach

The Court's holding on the territorial scope of de-indexing deserves special attention. A direction limited to google.co.in would be circumventable by the trivial act of accessing google.com. The Court therefore holds that de-indexing directions shall operate globally, across all versions and domains of the relevant search engine. This is consistent with the European approach post-Google Spain and directly addresses what would otherwise be a gaping loophole.

The enforcement mechanism directing MEITY to communicate these directions to Google LLC and all other search engine operators, with a compliance affidavit within four weeks also demonstrates awareness of the practical enforcement challenges.

6.4 Implications for Indian Kanoon and Legal Databases

The direction to Indian Kanoon to implement name-based search restrictions while preserving access by case number, citation, court, and date will require significant technical modifications to their platform. Indian Kanoon has already been before the Supreme Court in iKanoon Software Development Pvt. Ltd. v. Karthick Theodore (SLP(C) No. 15311 of 2024) on the issue of complete takedown. This judgment carefully avoids ordering complete takedown (which would raise the questions pending before the Supreme Court) and instead orders the narrower relief of name-search restriction. This is a constitutionally measured approach that preserves the legal database's public function while giving practical effect to individual privacy rights.

6.5 The Section 228A Dimension  A Statutory Right Reaffirmed

The Court's handling of W.P. 9929/2025 involving a victim of sexual offences whose identity had been published on Indian Kanoon without masking is important for a different reason. Here the Court invokes Section 228A IPC (now Section 72 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023), which prohibits disclosure of the identity of victims of sexual offences as a matter of statutory mandate, not merely judicial discretion. The de-indexing and name-search restriction directed in this case flows from statutory right, not the RTBF framework. The Court records "deep concern" that a victim of sexual offences had to approach the High Court to enforce a right that should have been given effect automatically.

This is a powerful reminder that for certain categories, we do not need the RTBF framework at all existing statutory protections, if properly implemented, are sufficient. The failure is one of implementation.

6.6 The DPDPA Angle A Gap the Legislature Must Now Fill

While the Court fills the gap through constitutional adjudication, it implicitly calls upon the legislature to act. The DPDPA 2023 defines data principals, data fiduciaries, and data processors in ways that would readily encompass individuals named in judicial records, court systems hosting those records, and search engines indexing them. The respondent MEITY itself acknowledged in submissions that search engines performing indexing, storing, and displaying of personal information may be "processors" of personal data under the DPDPA framework.

The next legislative step which this judgment makes urgent is an explicit provision in the DPDPA or allied rules establishing a right of erasure or delisting in relation to judicial and quasi-judicial records, with clear exceptions for public interest, public figures' public conduct, and convictions for serious offences. The EU's GDPR Article 17 framework, shaped by Google Spain, provides a ready reference.

Part VII: Practical Guidance for Practitioners and Individuals

For Individuals Seeking Relief

If you or your client's name appears in judicial records that are accessible through Google or Indian Kanoon in connection with concluded proceedings, this judgment provides a direct route to relief if:

• You have been acquitted, discharged, or had proceedings quashed
• You are the complainant/victim in proceedings where your identity has been exposed (statutory right, not RTBF)
• Your proceedings concluded through settlement or compounding
• The records relate to purely private civil or matrimonial disputes that have concluded
• You are not a public figure, or if you are, the content does not relate to your conduct in your public role
• You are not convicted of offences against women/children or for breach of public trust

The petition should be filed in the jurisdictional High Court, with Google LLC, Indian Kanoon, relevant media entities, and MEITY as respondents. The prayer should be precisely structured: global de-indexing from all search engine platforms and domains, restriction of name-based search on Indian Kanoon, and liberty to seek masking from the originating court.

For Companies

The judgment's application to a company (W.P. 18962/2025 Piscesia Power Transmission Private Limited) establishes that the RTBF framework is not limited to natural persons. Where a company's proceedings have been settled and FIRs quashed, and where outdated news reports continue to damage business reputation, de-indexing relief is available. Corporate counsel should take note.

For Media and Publishers

This judgment does not impose a blanket restraint on media publication. However, it establishes that where content is no longer proportionate in its continued digital accessibility  particularly where underlying legal proceedings have concluded in the subject's favour de-indexing may be directed. The Court is careful to note that where content is defamatory or inaccurate, separate legal remedies in defamation remain available. Media houses should consider proactively updating or contextualising archived content to reflect the final outcomes of legal proceedings they have covered.

Conclusion: A New Chapter in Indian Digital Rights

Twenty years ago, when I began my practice in cyber law, the "Right to Be Forgotten" was a European concept debated in academic papers. Ten years ago, after Google Spain, it became a globally recognised principle, but India had no statutory framework and courts were hesitant. Five years ago, after the Puttaswamy judgment, we began arguing it as a constitutional right often unsuccessfully.

Today, the Delhi High Court has delivered a judgment that:

1. Firmly grounds the RTBF in Article 21 as a facet of the constitutional right to informational privacy
2. Gives it enforceable, practical content through the twin reliefs of de-indexing and masking
3. Lays down a principled, non-mechanical framework for its application, with clear categories, tests, and absolute bars
4. Addresses the role of search engines as active data processors rather than passive conduits
5. Resolves the maintainability question writs lie against private digital entities for violations of fundamental rights
6. Sets global territorial scope for de-indexing directions

This is not merely a judgment that resolves 35 individual cases. It is a constitutional moment for Indian privacy law the moment when the right to informational privacy in the digital age ceased to be merely theoretical and became practically enforceable.

The legislature must now act. The DPDPA needs explicit RTBF provisions. Courts need internal masking systems at the point of filing. Indian Kanoon and similar platforms need built-in compliance mechanisms. And Google must implement these directions transparently, with public reporting on compliance.

Until then and beyond practitioners, individuals, and institutions will turn to this judgment as the foundational text of India's evolving digital privacy jurisprudence. In my two decades at the bar, I have rarely encountered a judgment that so precisely captures both the human stakes of a legal question and the jurisprudential rigour required to answer it.

Justice Datta's observation drawing from Justice Kaul's words in Puttaswamy captures it perfectly: the internet does not forget, and does not let humans forget. The law's answer, at last, is that it does not have to be so.

This article is published by LLMAdvocates for informational purposes and constitutes general legal commentary. It does not constitute legal advice for any specific matter. Readers with specific legal queries are encouraged to consult a qualified advocate.